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Abstract: During the preceding four decades, the “private” lives of 
politicians have been subjected to an increasing degree of public scrutiny; 
so much so that it might be argued that those pursuing or occupying 
elected office – especially senior positions (e.g., Cabinet ministers) – are 
often denied a degree of privacy commensurate with adequately respect-
ing and protecting human dignity. In this essay I argue that, while politi-
cians should not be expected to forsake all hope of privacy, the voluntary 
character of, and responsibilities attached to, elected political office, 
coupled with citizens’ democratic right to choose their political repre-
sentatives freely, renders it ethically legitimate for the “public” and many 
of the “private” elements of politicians’ lives to receive a degree of public 
scrutiny that greatly exceeds that experienced by their fellow citizens.
Keywords: politicians, privacy, democracy, public right to know, 
public import, human dignity.
1. INTRODUCTION
The news regularly contains stories about the misbehaviour of public 
figures – e.g., movie stars, sports personalities, famous musicians, politi-
cians, etc – which, in turn, often generate complaints about the “violation” 
of said public figures’ privacy. And not infrequently the information 
revealed proves damaging to the public figure(s) in question. Indeed, the 
careers of numerous high-profile public figures have been prematurely 
brought to an abrupt and unceremonious end as a result of public report-
ing about their “private” behaviour. The appetite and subsequent hunt 
for such problematic behaviour is perhaps nowhere more zealous and 
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relentless than in the political realm. The adversarial nature of demo-
cratic politics, especially during election periods, generates a largely un-
paralleled lust for “dirt” (i.e., potentially harmful information) related to 
the professional and personal lives of one’s competitors. Unsurprisingly, 
in such an environment the question of the proper scope of one’s “right” 
to privacy becomes a matter of ongoing debate. 
Below, I consider the legitimacy of the proposition that politicians in 
representative democracies1 should expect to have significantly less pri-
vacy than their fellow citizens. I begin by offering a brief description of 
the concept and value of privacy. After having done so, I examine the 
idea of “the public’s right to know” and its relationship to representative 
democracy and the degree of privacy afforded to politicians. I also reflect 
upon the notions of relevance and public import and their potential sig-
nificance in terms of demarcating the legitimate scope of the public’s right 
to know about the “private” lives of politicians. 
Within the context of the aforementioned examination, I offer a num-
ber of reasons for believing it legitimate for the “public” and many of the 
“private” elements of politicians’ lives to receive a degree of public scru-
tiny that notably exceeds that experienced by their fellow citizens. In 
particular, I argue that the proposed greater degree of scrutiny is justified 
by the voluntary and public character of both the occupation (i.e., politi-
cian) and the responsibilities associated with it,2 and necessitated by the 
demands of representative democracy. I also suggest that, while politicians 
should not be expected to forsake all hope of privacy, adequately satisfy-
ing citizens’ legitimate right to information generates enormous difficul-
ties for any effort seeking to establish clear, fixed parameters for the 
public’s right to know that exclude anything other than the most mundane 
personal information. I then briefly consider the potential to develop a 
viable approach to identifying parameters for the public’s right to know 
that protect anything more than the most mundane aspects of a person’s 
life, and the likely impact of a failure to do so. I conclude by briefly sum-
marizing the principal observations presented in the essay. 
1 Henceforth, all references to “politicians” should be understood as denoting 
politicians in contemporary representative democracies.
2 To be clear, the responsibilities in question are “voluntary” in the sense that they 
are assumed voluntarily insofar as one must voluntarily seek elected political office.
Ramon Llull Journal_09.indd   192 6/6/18   9:40
193YOUNG
POLITICIANS’ PRIVACY
2. THE CONCEPT AND VALUE OF PRIVACY
“Privacy” is an essentially contested concept – i.e., a concept the 
“proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about … [its] 
proper … [use] on the part of … [its] users”.3 Unsurprisingly, then, there 
currently exists no universally accepted single definition of “privacy”.4 
However, in order to complete the analysis that is the focus of this essay, 
a definition must be adopted. Accordingly, for the purposes of this essay, 
“privacy” should be understood as concerning the capacity of individuals 
“to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others”.5 In other words, privacy concerns 
one’s ability to keep information about herself/himself confidential unless 
s/he chooses to do otherwise. 
Precisely what constitutes a voluntary forsaking of confidentiality 
raises consideration of express versus tacit consent – i.e., whether one 
explicitly waives one’s right to privacy (i.e., express consent) or can be 
argued to have done so as a consequence of one’s actions (i.e., tacit 
consent). For example, any individual that divulges information in an 
3 W. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 56 (1956), p.169. Robert C. Post has offered the following lament: “Privacy 
is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so 
engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can 
be usefully addressed at all”. See R. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, Georgetown 
Law Journal 89 (2001), p. 2087.
4 For example, see Institute of Medicine, The Value and Importance of Health 
Information Privacy, [in:] Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing Privacy, 
Improving Health through Research, eds. S. Nass, L. Levit, and L. Gostin, Washing-
ton, DC, The National Academies Press 2009, p. 76; S. Wong, The Concept, Value 
and Right of Privacy, UCL Jurisprudence Review 3 (1996), p. 166; R. Gellman, Does 
Privacy Law Work?, [in:] Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, eds. P. Agre 
and M. Rotenberg, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press 1997, p. 194; W. Peekhaus, Person-
al Health Information in Canada: Clearing the Conceptual Underbrush and Ac-
counting for Public Opinion, Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Canadian 
Association for Information Science (2006), p. 5; and F. Schauer, Can Public Figures 
Have Private Lives?, Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (2000), p. 294.
5 A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, New York, Atheneum Publishers 1967, p. 
7; also see, for example, J. P. Dobel, Judging the Private Lives of Public Officials, 
Administration & Society 30 (1998), p. 116; and R. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits 
of Law, Yale Law Journal 89 (1980), pp. 428-429. It should be noted that Westin 
referred not only to individuals, but also to “groups” and “institutions” (see Westin, 
op. cit., p. 7). 
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environment in which those present cannot reasonably expect that no 
observation or recording may occur without their knowledge6 – such 
as in public parks, coffee shops, at “town hall” meetings, and so on7 
– might be understood to have tacitly consented to forsaking one’s 
privacy in that instance. Unsurprisingly, there remains significant debate 
about the legitimacy of applying the concept of tacit consent to matters 
of privacy.
The debate about such issues is merely one indication of the importance 
attached to the protection of privacy. What is the basis for that impor-
tance? Put differently, what is valuable about privacy? Akin to the situ-
ation with respect to defining “privacy”, there are numerous suggestions 
as to why privacy is valuable,8 including that it is necessary for autonomy, 
self-development, individual liberty, dignity, respect, establishing mean-
ingful relationships, and realising a properly functioning democracy.9 
More generally, privacy is often identified as an essential element of the 
“human condition”10 – i.e., a fundamental feature of what being human 
means: adequately respecting human dignity requires acknowledging and 
(reasonably) accommodating individuals’ privacy.11
6 N. Whiteman, Undoing Ethics: Rethinking Practice in Online Research, New 
York, Springer 2012, p. 55.
7 It might be argued that public parks and coffee shops (and other similar venues) 
are thought of as offering a certain (perhaps noteworthy) degree of privacy. However, 
the point is not that people believe that such venues offer no possible privacy, only 
that they are venues in which those present cannot reasonably expect that “no obser-
vation or recording” may occur without their knowledge – i.e., there is typically no 
assurance that such observation or recording will not occur. I thank Kevin Macnish 
for identifying the need for this clarification. 
8 I will not examine herein the question of whether privacy’s value is properly 
understood as intrinsic or instrumental, derivative or fundamental, or some combin-
ation thereof. 
9 For example, see Gavison, op. cit.; D. Solove, Understanding Privacy, London, 
Harvard University Press 2009, pp. 78-100; R. Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Argu-
ments and Assumptions, [in:] Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, 
ed. F. Schoeman, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1984, pp. 317-332; and 
Wong, op. cit.
10 For example, D. Miller, Do Politicians and Other Public Figures Have (Mor-
al) Privacy Rights which can be Asserted against the Media?, UCL Jurisprudence 
Review 3 (1996), pp. 152, 157; Post, op. cit.; Wong, op. cit.; Dobel, op. cit.; and C. 
Fried, Privacy, Yale Law Journal 77 (1968), pp. 475-493.
11 For example, Miller, op. cit., pp. 152, 157; Post, op. cit.; Dobel, op. cit.; and 
Fried, op. cit.
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Regardless of the precise reasons people offer to explain why they 
value privacy, most individuals believe not only that privacy is valuable, 
but also that they have a significant “right”12 to it.13 Consequently, 
“invasions” of privacy are usually considered a violation of one’s rights 
(moral and/or legal). However, the right to privacy can and does conflict 
with other rights; and as privacy is not (typically) considered an absolute 
right14 – either in a moral or a legal sense – it is generally accepted that 
there are instances in which its violation might reasonably be considered 
acceptable insofar as said violation serves the realisation of an objective 
that is understood to be of greater value/importance in the circum-
stances in question than is the protection of privacy (e.g., national secu-
rity). 
3.  POLITICIANS’ PRIVACY AND “THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO 
KNOW”
If one accepts privacy as being a constitutive element of what it means 
to be human, then, by definition, all humans are equally deserving of a 
prima facie protection of their privacy. However, there are a number of 
reasons for believing it acceptable for politicians to receive less privacy 
than that accorded to their fellow citizens. In particular, such a conclusion 
is supported by the following facts: 1) politicians pursue elected office 
and, in turn, enter the public realm voluntarily; 2) the public nature/
impact of the responsibilities possessed by elected politicians justifies their 
behaviour being subjected to a greater degree of scrutiny than that expe-
rienced by non-politicians; 3) the means by which politicians secure 
12 For the sake of argument, it will be assumed that privacy can legitimately be 
understood as a “right” as opposed to merely an “interest”. It has been presented as 
an important right in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948; Article 12) and in the European Convention on Human Rights (1950; Article 
8), for example. For a sample of the debate concerning the legitimacy of characterising 
privacy as a “right”, please see G. Negley, Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 
Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (1966), pp. 320-323; A. Rosenberg, Privacy as 
a Matter of Taste and Right, Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (2000), pp 68-90; and 
F. Davis, What do we mean by “Right to Privacy”?, South Dakota Law Review 4 
(1959), pp. 1-24.
13 For example, Wong, op. cit., pp. 165-166; and Institute of Medicine, op. cit., p. 
78.
14 In essence, an absolute right is one that cannot be legitimately overridden. 
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elected office and acquire the aforementioned responsibilities render them 
accountable to (at minimum) the electorate in a way that is not true of 
their unelected fellow citizens; and 4) the greater degree of scrutiny im-
posed upon politicians generates additional information that helps enable 
citizens to make informed decisions about the suitability/desirability of 
a candidate for elected office, which is pivotal to realizing citizens’ right 
to choose their elected representatives freely – an essential element of the 
idea of representative democracy. 
Importantly, politicians freely enter the “public” realm and, in so 
doing, knowingly expose themselves to a degree of scrutiny (by the media, 
in particular) that can be expected to notably exceed that experienced by 
non-public figures.15 The occupation of “politician” is necessarily “public” 
in nature and involves using the public realm to further specific ends, 
such as getting (re)elected and/or advancing a particular political or 
policy agenda or initiative. In entering and using the public realm, politi-
cians motivate and precipitate a degree of attention with respect to their 
professional and personal qualities and activities that exceeds that gener-
ated by “regular” members of the polity. Additionally, the nature of 
politicians’ employment and responsibilities provides an extremely pow-
erful argument in favour of their being subjected to a degree of public 
scrutiny greater than that experienced by their fellow citizens (including 
non-political public figures). Those elected to political office are involved 
in making decisions that in very significant ways affect the character and 
quality of the lives of all members of the polity (i.e., public policy and 
governmental program decisions). Politicians are placed in such a position 
and, by extension, vested with such power via public elections. That fact 
renders politicians accountable to the electorate (and, one might argue, 
to all citizens of the polity) for their behaviour while in office; and that 
accountability generates a “public right to know” about the behaviour 
and character of politicians – a right that is not equally applicable to non-
politicians.
15 For example, see L. Sun, Draw a Line between Freedom of Speech and Privacy 
of Public Figures, Humanity (2013), p. 41; J. Nordhaus, Celebrities’ Rights to Privacy: 
How Far Should the Paparazzi be Allowed to Go?, The Review of Litigation 18 
(1999), p. 289; Miller, op. cit., p. 157; D. Flint, Public Figures and the Press, Policy 
11 (1995), p. 9; and J. Skell Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public’s Right to 
Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, Texas Law Review 46 (1968), p. 
637.
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Relatedly, in a representative democracy that deserves the name,16 
citizens must have the right to freely choose their political representatives; 
in order to exercise that right to the greatest degree possible, citizens must 
be able to develop informed determinations17 as to politicians’ suitability 
for occupying elected political office.18 Arguably, developing such deter-
minations requires access to a variety of “professional” and “personal” 
information about the candidates in question. But precisely what informa-
tion does that requirement encompass? 
4. RELEVANCE AND PUBLIC IMPORT
It seems relatively uncontroversial to suggest that the public’s right to 
know with respect to politicians’ “private” lives should encompass infor-
mation that can reasonably be understood to in some manner reveal or 
otherwise indicate politicians’ ability – potential or realised – to satisfac-
torily fulfill the responsibilities associated with the elected office they 
occupy or are seeking to secure.19 Thus, the type of information that the 
public has a legitimate claim to access is that which is relevant to assessing 
the individual’s capacity to perform the functions of her/his position 
effectively;20 it is information that is needed to enable citizens to offer 
informed determinations about who is best suited to be given responsibil-
ity for making decisions that will impact the character and quality of life 
16 The qualification “that deserves the name” has been included in order to ac-
knowledge that there have existed many self-proclaimed “representative democracies” 
that are representative and/or democratic in little (if anything) more than name or 
self-serving attribution. For a useful (brief) commentary on the (mis)application of the 
label “democratic”, see M. Warren, What can Democratic Participation Mean Today?, 
Political Theory 30:5 (2002), pp. 677-678.
17 In turn, developing informed determinations about suitability for office can be 
understood to be necessary to enabling citizens to offer (a type of) informed consent 
to have the individual occupy the office in question.
18 Henceforth, all references to “elected office” should be understood as referring 
to elected political office.
19 See, for example, Schauer, op. cit., p. 297.
20 For example, Dobel, op. cit., p. 119; R. Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy 
and the Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1993, pp. 14-15; Miller, op. cit., pp. 162-163; 
and J. Lichtenberg, The Politics of Character and the Character of Journalism, Dis-
cussion Paper D-2. Presented at the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center, John F Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University (1989).
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within the polity. Such information is of public import – i.e., it concerns 
matters that are of importance to the polity as a whole, as opposed to 
being merely a source of general curiosity to various citizens (e.g., 
whether a particular politician has a tattoo or listens to a particular musi-
cal artist).
J. Patrick Dobel has concluded that the nature of the responsibilities 
attached to elected office suggests that politicians should (ideally) be “hon-
est, accountable, and competent, possess integrity and self-discipline to 
keep promises and resist temptations, … [be] able to exercise judgment 
under complex and difficult circumstances, and have the imagination and 
skill to exercise the symbolic dimensions of the office”.21 Consequently, 
according to the argument from relevance, any and all information that 
relates to determining the degree to which a politician possesses and ex-
hibits the aforementioned qualities is of public import and, in turn, 
within the scope of the public’s right to know. However, even if one 
accepts the preceding argument, the question of specifically what informa-
tion is needed to enable citizens to make the necessary determinations 
remains. History has amply demonstrated that it can be extremely chal-
lenging to assess with any significant degree of certainty the precise extent 
to which someone possesses the qualities deemed important to effectively 
fulfilling the responsibilities associated with elected office.22
The information voluntarily provided by politicians and the political 
parties with which they are affiliated is often relatively innocuous and 
predictable. There will certainly be no indication that a candidate for 
political office possesses any qualities or has engaged in any behaviour 
that is likely to raise questions about her/his suitability to occupy said 
office; indeed, candidates will be presented as being ideally suited for the 
office they occupy or for which they are campaigning. And the reliabil-
ity of the information provided by candidates is often uncertain or oth-
erwise questionable – there are numerous documented instances in which 
information about candidates has been knowingly exaggerated or is 
completely false. The challenge of securing valid, useful information can 
be particularly acute with respect to those who have yet to occupy an 
elected office – a phenomenon witnessed, for example, with respect to 
Donald Trump’s 2016 candidacy for the presidency of the United States. 
How does one judge with any noteworthy degree of confidence the abil-
21 Dobel, op. cit., p. 122.
22 Ibidem.
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ity of another to fulfill the responsibilities of elected office when the 
person being judged has not previously occupied such an office or a 
comparable position? Moreover, even when one has occupied elected 
office or a position of some comparability, that person’s publicly docu-
mented past performance may offer little insight with respect to assessing 
the degree to which s/he possesses and exhibits the desired qualities and/
or is likely to do so in the future.23 Alternatively, even if the public record 
suggests someone has fulfilled her/his job-related responsibilities flaw-
lessly, that person’s “private” behaviour may “raise reasonable doubts 
about future performance on the job”.24
As a consequence of the aforementioned issues and concerns, it does 
not seem unreasonable to suggest that citizens might legitimately need to 
explore aspects of a politician’s private life in order to secure the informa-
tion necessary to render a satisfactorily informed decision about said 
politician’s suitability for elected office. But, even if one accepts that 
conclusion, determinations regarding precisely what constitutes “relevant” 
information are often subjective and diverge notably.25 For example, while 
citizens who strictly adhere to the idea of a clear separation between 
church and state may consider information about a politician’s religious 
practices (or lack thereof) to have no legitimate bearing on her/his abil-
ity to satisfy the demands of elected office competently, others may deem 
the same information to be critical to any effort to determine suitability 
for elected office insofar as the politician’s affirmation of a particular or 
no religious faith might be considered an indication of that politician’s 
(in)ability to understand and, consequently, effectively represent the in-
terests of the citizens in question. Moreover, if one believes, as do many, 
that the personal is the political,26 then there is seemingly little informa-
tion that could not be understood as being relevant to citizens’ decision-
making exercises. Given such subjectivity and potential disagreement, the 
task of demarcating a meaningful and widely acceptable boundary between 
1) information that is relevant/of public import, and 2) purely “private” 
information might seem rather hopeless.
23 Dobel, op. cit., pp. 123, 133.
24 See, for example, D. Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office, Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press 1987, p. 141.
25 See, for example, Miller, op. cit.
26 For example, S. Thomas, The Personal is the Political: Antecedents of Gendered 
Choices of Elected Representatives, Sex Roles 47 (2002), pp. 343-353.
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5. IS THERE A VIABLE OPTION?
Frederick Schauer has suggested that it is possible to distinguish between 
“morally permissible and morally impermissible tastes” with respect to 
information relevant to assessing a politician’s capacity to fulfill the duties 
of her/his elected office.27 According to Schauer, “This distinction is 
designed to capture the difference between those criteria with which we 
disagree but that we believe people may legitimately employ, and those 
criteria that we believe may not be legitimately employed by anyone”.28 
Schauer offers marital fidelity as a potential example of the former, and 
sexual orientation, ethnicity and gender as possible examples of the latter. 
He suggests that a consequence of this approach is that information that 
some believe relevant to determinations of suitability will, nevertheless, 
be considered beyond the scope of the public’s right to know.29 How-
ever, having said that, Schauer eventually concludes that determinations 
of what constitutes relevant information will inevitably and legitimately 
be “based on a voter’s own conception of the morally permissible criteria 
that are material to an office”.30 Hence, his proposed distinction does not 
necessarily seem to notably impact the potential scope of the information 
that citizens can claim is “relevant” or important to their decision-making. 
One might instead suggest that the public’s right to know should be 
limited to information that concerns qualities or activities that have had 
or might have a detrimental impact on the effective governance of the 
society and the maintenance of a reasonably just democratic polity – i.e., 
information concerning public harms.31 For example, if a Minister re-
sponsible for matters of national security and defence frequently engaged 
27 Schauer, op. cit., p. 303 (emphasis added).
28 Ibidem.
29 Ibidem.
30 Schauer, op. cit., pp. 307-308 (emphasis added).
31 Such a proposal adopts an understanding of privacy that draws upon John Stu-
art Mill’s use of the “harm principle” to distinguish between the “self-regarding” (i.e., 
private) and the “other-regarding” (i.e., public) spheres. Essentially, Mill argued that 
behaviour should be considered self-regarding/private unless it will cause harm to 
others (see, for example, J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John 
Gray, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 83-102). However, to be clear, 
the approach to privacy employed in this essay is not founded upon a comprehensive 
embrace of Mill’s distinction between the self-regarding and other-regarding spheres. 
I want to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting that I comment on 
this matter.
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in behaviour that rendered her/him vulnerable to extortion (e.g., regu-
larly became involved in extra-marital affairs, frequently hired prostitutes, 
etc), even if the problematic activities occurred “outside” of work, that 
information could legitimately be considered as being within the public’s 
right to know. 
However, with respect to both what constitutes a public harm and 
distinguishing between “morally permissible” and “morally impermis-
sible” evaluation criteria, noteworthy disagreement among citizens seems 
inevitable. As John Rawls,32 among others,33 has noted, contemporary 
liberal democracies (CLDs) are characterised by the “fact” of reasonable 
pluralism. Rawls differentiates between reasonable pluralism and the more 
familiar understanding of pluralism, which he refers to as simple plural-
ism.34 The important distinction between the two is as follows: whereas 
simple pluralism allows for the existence of any number of conceptions 
of the good that affirm the belief that it is acceptable to use coercive state 
power to enforce adherence to their dictates (or, alternatively, to suppress 
others’ views), the overwhelming majority of conceptions of the good 
that populate an environment characterised by reasonable pluralism 
consider it unreasonable and, hence, unacceptable to use state power in 
such a manner. All reasonable conceptions of the good allow for the 
continued presence of views with which they disagree – i.e., they accept 
the unavoidability of value pluralism and do not support the use of state 
power to secure the public primacy of, or obedience to, a particular 
conception of the good. And, importantly, reasonable conceptions of the 
good recognise that reasonable pluralism “is not a mere historical condi-
tion that may soon pass away; [rather,] it is a permanent feature of the 
public culture of [CLDs]”.35
Reasonable pluralism is a consequence of “the exercise of human 
reason within the framework of the free institutions of a [CLD]”,36 which, 
in turn, results in reasonable disagreement – i.e., a difference of opinion 
32 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edition, New York, Columbia Uni-
versity Press 1996, pp. xvii-xix.
33 See, for example, C. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, New York, Cambridge 
University Press 1996; and G. Klosko, Reasonable Rejection and Neutrality of 
Justification, [in:] Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory, eds. Steven 
Wall and George Klosko, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield 2003, pp. 167-189.
34 For example, Rawls, op. cit., pp. 36, 164.
35 Rawls, op. cit., p. 36.
36 Rawls, op. cit., p. xviii; also see, for example, p. 4.
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between reasonable people as to the character and precise content of the 
“good” life. Reasonable people can be understood as individuals who 
“seek a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with 
others on terms all can accept”;37 “they treat their fellow citizens in a 
‘reasonable’ manner, which necessitates that they recognise them as free 
and equal agents, and ‘take into account the consequences of their actions 
on others’ well-being’ (Rawls, 1996:49n1)”.38 Reasonable disagreement 
among reasonable people is “not the result of self-interest, nor the result 
of prejudice, nor irrationality (although disagreement can obviously be 
caused by these factors as well). The disagreement is reasonable in the 
sense that it exists as a result of the sincere and reasonable efforts of ra-
tional people to consider ethical, religious, and philosophical questions”.39 
Like reasonable pluralism, reasonable disagreement is an unavoidable and 
ineliminable feature of life in CLDs.40 But, when such disagreement 
arises, who decides which party is “correct” or has the more persuasive 
case, and/or who determines the procedures that will be employed to 
make such decisions? 
An initial inclination might be to suggest that such matters be deter-
mined via “majority rule”; which is to say, the public’s right to know 
should encompass whatever information the majority of the citizenry 
believes to be relevant to assessing the capacity of politicians to fulfill their 
responsibilities effectively. However, aside from the practical challenge 
associated with determining with acceptable accuracy the opinion of the 
majority of the citizenry and ensuring that the understanding being em-
ployed always reflects current opinion, it could be argued that, in denying 
certain individuals (i.e., those in the “minority”) the right to determine 
for themselves what information is relevant to their decision-making, 
such an approach denies those individuals the opportunity to render a 
37 Rawls, op. cit., p. 50; also see, for example, J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, ed. E. Kelly, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press 2001, pp. 6–7.
38 S. Young, The (Un)Reasonableness of Rawlsian Rationality, South African 
Journal of Philosophy 24 (2005), pp. 309.
39 J. Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2010, p. 37.
40 C. Larmore, Political Liberalism, Political Theory 18 (1990), p. 340; also see, 
for example, Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, pp. 12, 122; and Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, p. 55. As Isaiah Berlin observed, such diversity and conflict is “an intrin-
sic, irremovable element in human life” (I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 1969, p. 167).
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freely developed decision about a critically important aspect of their lives; 
such a denial surely undermines a fundamental principle of representative 
democracy.41 
The end result of the above-noted considerations seems to be that any 
proposed parameters for the public’s “right to know” are likely to en-
counter what any number of citizens will consider to be reasonable 
opposition – i.e., opposition premised upon arguments that no (reason-
able) person could reasonably reject as inapplicable or unimportant.42 
However, if privacy is an essential feature of what it means to be human, 
then (theoretically, at least) politicians require some degree of privacy if 
their humanity is to be adequately respected. While it seems unlikely that 
anyone would deny politicians the right to some privacy, the argument 
presented in the preceding paragraphs brings into doubt whether politi-
cians should expect to be afforded privacy for anything other than the 
most mundane personal matters, such as using the washroom or taking 
a bath/shower; and such a situation generates consequences that citizens 
should consider. 
6.  SOME POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A BROAD 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW
While there are legitimate reasons for arguing that politicians should 
expect to be granted notably less privacy than their fellow citizens, it 
should also be recognised that such a situation is likely to generate certain 
undesirable consequences. In particular, it does not seem unreasonable to 
suspect that the degree of scrutiny to which many politicians are now 
subjected is likely to dissuade any number of extremely well-qualified and 
well-intentioned individuals from pursuing elected office. The media’s 
increasing focus on uncovering salacious private behaviour by politicians 
and sensationalising the slightest personal misstep43 has not only destroyed 
many political careers, regardless of how well the individuals in question 
41 See, for example, Schauer, op. cit.
42 For relevant discussions please see Rawls, op. cit., and T. Scanlon, What We 
Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 1998. 
43 That focus has also seemingly been embraced to a noteworthy degree by polit-
icians and political parties (see, for example, Dobel, op. cit., p. 116).
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have (or may have) performed their official duties;44 it has also meant that 
important policy matters and significant public initiatives have received 
less media attention than is warranted/desirable.45 Arguably, there is no 
compelling reason to believe that the “scandal genie” will or can be “put 
back in the bottle”. Additionally, ongoing advances in information and 
communications technologies will only continue to make it increasingly 
difficult to maintain privacy. Hence, supporting the broadest possible 
interpretation of the public’s right to know in the name of realising de-
mocracy to the greatest degree has the ironic and paradoxical effect of 
potentially reducing the number of citizens who seek to exercise their 
democratic right to pursue and hold elected office (to say nothing of how 
that consequence might negatively impact the polity’s potential achieve-
ments and well-being), thereby undermining the realisation of a funda-
mental element of democracy.
7. CONCLUSION
During the preceding four decades, the “private” lives of politicians 
have been subjected to an increasing degree of public scrutiny;46 so much 
so that it might be argued that those pursuing or occupying elected office 
– particularly senior positions (e.g., Cabinet ministers) – have very little 
privacy. But is such a situation ethically acceptable if privacy is a constitu-
tive element of what it means to be human, and, in turn, all humans (qua 
humans) are equally deserving of privacy? I have argued herein that the 
voluntary character of, and responsibilities attached to, elected office, 
coupled with citizens’ right to choose their political representatives freely, 
produce a situation in which it is legitimate that the privacy afforded to 
politicians be notably less than that afforded to their fellow citizens. 
Politicians – those in office and those seeking to be elected – voluntar-
ily enter the public realm and, in so doing, knowingly expose themselves 
44 Dobel, op. cit., p. 115.
45 See, for example, J. Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, 
New York, Basic Books 1991. 
46 See, for example, Dobel, op. cit., p. 126; A. Barker, The Upturned Stone: 
Political Scandals and Their Investigation Processes in Twenty Democracies, Crime, 
Law and Social Change 21 (1994), pp. 337-373; and Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy: 
How Attack Journalism has Transformed American Politics, New York, Macmillan 
1991.
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to a greater degree of public scrutiny than is typically experienced by their 
fellow citizens. And given the reality of the past (at least) 40 years, it 
cannot plausibly be claimed by any contemporary politician that s/he 
was unaware of the increased public scrutiny that accompanies the pursuit 
and occupation of elected office. Perhaps even more significant, elected 
officials are bestowed with the unique authority to establish public policies 
and programs,47 creations that impact all members of the polity. That fact 
generates a legitimate claim by members of the electorate to have access 
to as much information as is necessary to assess the “fitness” of candidates 
for, and occupants of, elected office – and, in particular, the wisdom of 
allowing them to possess and exercise the associated authority. Con-
comitantly, the capacity to render such an assessment is an essential 
contribution to citizens’ ability to freely select their political representa-
tives inasmuch as access to all “relevant” information about those seeking/
occupying elected office is necessary to enable a genuinely informed and, 
by extension, unconstrained choice, a foundational element of repre-
sentative democracy. 
The question becomes: what type of information is needed to render 
such assessments effectively? I have herein suggested that elements of 
politicians’ public and private lives constitute relevant information and, 
in turn, I have identified some possible ways to delineate “relevant” from 
“irrelevant” information within those spheres. However, I have also 
concluded that, given the ineliminable presence of a diversity of compet-
ing and, at times, conflicting and irreconcilable reasonable beliefs and 
values and the resulting reasonable disagreement, there is an immense (if 
not insurmountable) challenge associated with protecting politicians’ 
privacy concerning anything other than the most mundane personal 
matters; and the potential consequences of that situation – in particular, 
an unwillingness by any number of qualified individuals to pursue 
elected office – should give some pause for thought to those who are 
generally inclined to allow politicians’ privacy to be trumped by the 
public’s right to know.
Nevertheless, arguably, the potential consequences of assigning pri-
macy to “the public’s right to know” are “the lesser of two evils”. As 
47 Though there are certainly non-politicians involved in the development of pub-
lic policies and programs, in a representative democracy it is only the elected members 
of government who can legally establish public policy and public (i.e., legally-mandat-
ed) programs.
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noted, an animating feature of contemporary representative democracy 
is the right of citizens to determine by and for themselves who will rep-
resent them in government. The ability of citizens to accurately identify 
those that will best represent their beliefs, values and interests directly 
corresponds to the amount of professional and personal information that 
citizens can acquire about the candidates vying for those positions. Con-
sequently, the ideal of representative democracy is most fully realized 
when citizens have access to the greatest amount of (valid) information 
about those who wish to represent them in government and, in turn, are 
best able to make informed decisions about the “quality” and subsequent 
suitability of those candidates.48
While it is regrettable that some eminently qualified and extremely well-
intentioned individuals might be dissuaded from pursuing elected office 
because they do not wish to subject themselves – and their family, their 
friends, etc. – to the type of hyper-scrutiny identified herein, such a situation 
does not undermine the opportunity for citizens to make informed decisions 
about who will best serve their interests in government. Of course, there 
is no guarantee that citizens will either seek out or consume all available 
relevant information and, by extension, render truly “informed” decisions 
– indeed, there is a large volume of scholarship that suggests that a significant 
proportion of many electorates does not make decisions that would reason-
ably be considered “informed” in the sense of being based upon a good 
understanding and reasoned assessment of available relevant information49 
(even within the context of the constraints of bounded rationality50). How-
ever, what is critical is not that it is guaranteed that citizens engage in such 
informed decision-making, but that they be provided the opportunity to 
do so.51 It is impossible to ensure that citizens make only informed decisions 
48 See, for example, I. Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, Critical 
Review 12 (1998), p. 413.
49 See, for example, I. Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller 
Government Is Smarter, 2nd edition, Stanford, Stanford University Press 2016; and 
Somin, op. cit.
50 As used herein, “bounded rationality” refers to the cognitive and temporal 
limitations that constrain an individual’s opportunity to process all available informa-
tion. See, for example, B. Lipman, Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: 
A Survey, Canadian Journal of Economics 28 (1995), pp. 42-67.
51 Of course, even if the proposed information is accessible, it will remain a daunt-
ing task to try to determine with certainty an individual’s true moral character. How-
ever, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the availability of such information 
can serve to enhance the potential accuracy of such determinations. I want to thank 
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when choosing which candidate will receive their vote; but it is possible to 
make available the information that establishes an environment in which 
citizens can render such decisions, and, in so doing, help to realize a funda-
mental element of the idea of representative democracy.52 
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